State v. Spokas Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43933 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-28-2016
State v. Spokas Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43933
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Spokas Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43933" (2016). Not Reported. 3106.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3106
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




ERIC SCOTT SPOKAS, 
 












          NO. 43933 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2015-9992 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Spokas failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by imposing 




Spokas Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Spokas pled guilty, via an Alford1 plea, to aggravated assault and the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, suspended the 
sentence, and placed Spokas on supervised probation for four years.  (R., pp.49, 85-
1 
 
92.)  Spokas filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.94-
96.)   
Spokas asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in light of his alcohol use, 
his status as a first-time felon, because he and the victim “were attempting to reconcile 
at the change of plea hearing,” and because, he claims, the district court may have 
sentenced him to a longer term “because of his Alford plea.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.2-4.)  
The record supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for aggravated assault is five years.  I.C. § 18-
906.  The district court imposed an underlying unified sentence of four years, with two 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.85-92.)  
Furthermore, Spokas’ underlying sentence is appropriate in light of the seriousness of 
the offense, his history of criminal offending, his refusal to accept responsibility for his 
criminal conduct, his denial he has a substance abuse or anger problem, his lack of 
amenability to treatment, and his high risk to reoffend.   
Spokas has a lengthy criminal history that spans at least four states and includes 
convictions for “DC-Offensive of Risk of Harm,” two convictions for carrying a concealed 
weapon, two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, minor misdemeanor 
drug abuse, retail theft, driving under the influence, three convictions for invalid driver’s 
license, driving without privileges, third-degree theft, misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance, unauthorized use of property, and petit theft.  (PSI, pp.5-9.2)  He 
also has numerous charges for which no disposition was reported, including charges for 
theft, driving under the influence, second-degree criminal trespass, and felony 
possession of a controlled substance.  (PSI, pp.6-8.)  In addition, Spokas’ record 
includes multiple probation violations and failures to appear.  (PSI, pp.6-7, 9.)   
In the instant offense, Spokas “grabbed [the victim] around the neck and pushed 
her against the car underneath the carport.”  (PSI, p.3.)  He squeezed her neck until she 
“felt dizzy” and she “fell to the ground next to the vehicle.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Spokas then fled 
the scene and the victim remained on the ground for four to five minutes “because she 
felt dizzy.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Officers later observed the victim had “a 2 ¼ inch bruise on the 




front of her neck when she turned her head.”  (PSI, p.3.)  Despite the victim’s injuries, 
Spokas refused to accept responsibility for his conduct, repeatedly blaming her and 
claiming she “made all this up because she was mad at him” and/or “felt rejected by 
him,” and stating “‘she is an accident prone alcoholic.’”  (PSI, pp.4-5, 12, 15, 17, 108, 
114.)  At sentencing, the district court advised: 
The difficulty that I have in sentencing in a case like this, Mr. 
Spokas, is this.  It’s difficult to structure rehabilitation terms for someone 
who says they didn’t do it.  In the end, that’s what you told the 
presentence investigator; that you have no culpability in this and you place 
all of the blame on your victim.  And that makes it more difficult for me to 
figure what an appropriate sentence is.  Essentially I’m sentencing 
somebody who does not uniformly agree that you did anything wrong that 
brings you before this court for sentencing.   
 
(Tr., p.36, Ls.14-24.)   
The district court did not, as Spokas suggests, impose a longer sentence 
“because of [Spokas’] Alford plea” (Appellant’s Brief, p.4); in fact, it imposed a lesser 
sentence than was recommended by the state as part of the plea agreement (Tr., p.2, 
Ls.10-15; p.30, Ls.3-4; p.38, Ls.5-10), taking into consideration Spokas’ continued 
refusal to accept responsibility, attempts to blame the victim, denial that he has a 
substance abuse or anger problem, and lack of amenability to treatment (PSI, pp.16-17, 
24, 26, 114-16).  
 On appeal, Spokas contends the district court should have imposed a lesser 
underlying sentence in light of his “struggles with alcohol” and because he “was under 
the influence of alcohol” when he committed the instant offense.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.3-4.)  However, Spokas denied having an alcohol problem and claimed he only 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SPOKAS 




                                                                                                                                            
consumed “‘maybe a beer’” on the day of the instant offense.  (PSI, pp.5, 16, 24.)  He 
further denied having a substance abuse problem of any kind and stated he did not 
need treatment.  (PSI, pp.16, 24.)  Yet, Spokas repeatedly missed his UA testing while 
on pretrial release and, just two weeks before sentencing, he tested positive for both 
alcohol and THC while at the courthouse.  (R., pp.75-76; PSI, p.16.)  The underlying 
sentence imposed is reasonable in light of Spokas’ denial he has a substance abuse 
problem, continued use of drugs and alcohol pending sentencing for the instant offense, 
and lack of amenability to treatment.   
 In addition to his denial of a substance abuse problem and lack of amenability to 
substance abuse treatment, Spokas claimed he “does not have an anger problem in 
any way,” and he did not believe he required anger management or domestic violence 
treatment.  (PSI, pp.114, 116.)  The domestic violence evaluator determined Spokas 
presents “a medium risk for future domestic violence” and advised Spokas “does not 
appear ready for treatment.”  (PSI, pp.116-17.)  The presentence investigator reported 
Spokas presents a high risk to reoffend and recommended, “based on his continued 
alcohol and drug use (which is suspected to be more than he reported), combined with 
his denial of any accountability, Mr. Spokas may benefit from treatment within a 
structured environment, such as a Retained Jurisdiction, in order to assess his 
progress.”  (PSI, pp.17, 20.)   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence.  Spokas’ underlying sentence is appropriate in light of the serious 
nature of the instant offense, Spokas’ history of criminal offending and violating his 
probation, his refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct and denial he has 
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a substance abuse or anger problem, his lack of amenability to treatment, and his high 
risk to reoffend.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Spokas has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion.   
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Spokas’ conviction and 
sentence.   




      __/s/_________________________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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